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BANNING NONCOMPETES IN VIRGINIA
Christopher J. Sullivan *
Justin A. Ritter **
ABSTRACT
The past decade has seen a nationwide wave of reform in
noncompete law, specifically the limitation of noncompete
agreements. Since 2016, ten states—including Virginia in 2020—
banned the use of noncompete agreements against certain “lowwage” employees. In order to stay ahead of this curve and ensure
Virginia remains and grows as one of the top states to do business,
this Article suggests that Virginia—like its neighbor, the District of
Columbia, initially did in 2021—pass a complete ban of all
noncompete agreements in the employment context. Such a ban
would make Virginia a lucrative destination for entrepreneurs and
startups by maximizing the job and employee market and keeping
the best business opportunities for employers and employees alike
in-state. The Article forecasts this effect by examining the rise of
California’s Silicon Valley, where employee noncompete agreements
are banned, and the converse decline of innovation in Michigan
since 1985, when the state accidentally repealed its noncompete
ban. Virginia would specifically benefit from a ban of employee
noncompetes because its current noncompete law is inadequate.
This Article argues that Virginia courts’ longstanding three-prong
test weighing legitimate business interest, undue hardship, and
public policy is dangerously unpredictable—so much so that the
Supreme Court of Virginia once upheld and struck down the exact
same noncompete agreement in two different cases—resulting in
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legal guesswork and unfair bargaining power between employer
and employee. This Article also suggests that Virginia’s 2020 “lowwage” ban insufficiently addresses the issues at hand and even
further adds to the burden of deciphering the law. While some may
claim employee noncompete agreements are necessary to protect
legitimate business interests and advance the freedom of contract,
this Article responds that such business interests are already
adequately protected by other, less problematic provisions—namely,
confidentiality and nonsolicitation agreements—and that the
freedom of contract is not any less valuable than the freedom of
trade, which employee noncompete agreements severely restrain.
Finally, this Article proposes model legislation to aid the Virginia
General Assembly, and other jurisdictions who may follow suit, in
passing such a ban.
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INTRODUCTION
Virginia’s entrepreneurial and general business ecosystem have
evolved considerably since the turn of the century. In recent years,
Virginia has been consistently ranked as one of the top states to do
business, and at times has been ranked number one.1 Despite such
success, Virginia, together with its sister states, have dealt with
its set of challenges: 9/11 and its aftermath, the 2008 recession, the
COVID-19 pandemic, and most recently rampant inflation, supply
chain issues, and certain technology-centric employee talent
shortages. To remain competitive, and arguably at or near the top
as the best state to do business, Virginia must be proactive in its
laws and not reactive to what may come in the future.
This Article suggests one small measure where Virginia can be
proactive in its laws to remain at or near the top—a universal ban
of noncompete agreements in the employment context.
Noncompete agreements are contracts limiting one party’s
competitive activities against the economic interests of another
party—within a specified market, geographic scope, and time
period—after a business relationship between the parties terminates. Such relationships after which noncompete agreements
have been enforced include that of partners of a partnership,
members of a limited liability company, or shareholders of a
corporation; buyer and seller of a business acquisition or asset
purchase; or—the focus of this Article—employer and employee.
This Article argues that employee noncompete agreements
frustrate and stifle innovation, job creation, and thus related
anticipated state income and related local tax receipts. The authors
of this Article believe that noncompete agreements in the
employment context are arbitrary, inherently unfair to the
employee, and do little to protect legitimate business interests
given that alternative protections currently and should continue to
exist (nonsolicitation agreements and confidentiality agreements,
for example).
Universally banning noncompete agreements in the
employment context is not a fix-all solution, but rather one of many
1. Scott Cohn, Virginia Is Back as America’s Top State for Business in 2021, CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/amp/2021/07/13/virginia-is-back-as-americas-top-state-for-business.
html [https://perma.cc/WZJ8-AFTL] (July 13, 2021, 11:31 AM) (ranking Virginia first in
CNBC’s America’s Top State for Business study, Virginia’s fifth time at number once since
the study began in 2007).

SULLIVAN MASTER COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

BANNING NONCOMPETES

11/30/2022 10:55 AM

239

options to consider given the current economic climate of the
Commonwealth and the United States at large.
Part I of this Article provides a brief history and survey of the
varying noncompete laws across the fifty states and the District of
Columbia. Specifically, it explains the noncompete laws of
Oklahoma, North Dakota, and California, the three states that
historically banned noncompete agreements; the past decade’s
wave of noncompete reform across a majority of states, namely
noncompete bans for low-wage employees passed by Virginia and
others; the District of Columbia’s trailblazing general ban of
employee noncompetes, effective October, 1, 2022; and a closer
examination into the evolution of noncompete law in Virginia. Part
II then explains the two central reasons why Virginia should pass
its own categorical ban on employee noncompete agreements: the
growth it would bring to Virginia’s economy and job market,
evidenced by case studies into the respective growth and decline of
nonenforcing and enforcing jurisdictions; and the dangerous unpredictability of Virginia’s current noncompete law, inadequately
addressed by Virginia’s most recent legislative reform. Part III of
this Article then addresses what the authors expect to be the two
most common counterarguments against an employee noncompete
ban: risking employer’s legitimate business interests and the
freedom of contract. Finally, Part IV suggests model legislation
effectuating a ban of employee noncompete agreements for the
Virginia General Assembly to adopt in its next legislative session,
drafted in such a manner where it could and should be replicated
in other states.
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF NONCOMPETE LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Original Bans: North Dakota, California, and Oklahoma
Forty-seven out of fifty states currently enforce employee noncompete agreements, to varying extents.2 The three exceptional
states that have banned employee noncompete agreements are

2. See generally RUSSELL BECK, BECK REED RIDEN LLP, EMPLOYEE NONCOMPETES: A
STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (2022), https://beckreedriden.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/
Noncompetes-50-State-Survey-Chart-20220817.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P5C-HDLR].
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Oklahoma,3 North Dakota,4 and—the state which has garnered the
most attention from scholars in the area of noncompete law5—
California.6 Yet do not be quick to assume that these states passed
relatively recent legislation to effectuate such bans. California did
not, as one may initially expect, ban employee noncompete
agreements as an intentional catalyst or reaction to the boom of
Silicon Valley and the technology industry. No, noncompete
agreements have been banned in California since 1872—just
twenty-two years after it had become a state.7 Likewise, Oklahoma
and North Dakota have banned noncompete agreements since
1890 and 1865—respectively seventeen and twenty-four years
before either became a state.8 Notably, Michigan was once the
fourth jurisdiction in this group, banning noncompete agreements
in 1905, but it repealed its ban in 19859—making it a particularly
interesting case study when considering a noncompete ban in
Virginia.10
The initial bans in these three jurisdictions were very broad.
Indeed, each read essentially as the same single sentence: “Every
contract by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful
profession, trade, or business of any kind . . . is to that extent
void.”11 Overtime, each jurisdiction amended their bans to include
express exceptions in which noncompete agreements could be
enforced. These exceptions include the sale of the goodwill of a
business12 and the noncompetition of partners against a partnership, members against a limited liability company, and/or share-

3. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 217, 219A (2022).
4. N.D. CENT CODE § 9-08-06 (2022).
5. See, e.g., infra Section II.A.1.
6. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (Deering 2022).
7. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1673 (Deering 1872); see Samuel Shipley, List of U.S. States’ Dates
of Admission to the Union, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/list-of-U-S-statesby-date-of-admission-to-the-Union-2130026 [https://perma.cc/DG3N-PGA8] (Feb. 11, 2020).
8. OKLA. STAT. ch. 17, § 886 (1890); TERR. D. REV. CODE 1877, CIV. CODE, § 959 (1877);
Shipley, supra note 7.
9. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.761 (1905), repealed by Michigan Antitrust Reform Act
(MARA), id. § 445.774a (2022).
10. See infra Section II.A.2.
11. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1673 (Deering 1872); see also OKLA. STAT. ch. 17, § 886 (1890)
(“Every contract by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or
business of any kind . . . is to that extent void.”); TERR. D. REV. CODE 1877, CIV. CODE, § 959
(1877) (“Every contract by which any one is restrained from exercising a lawful profession,
trade, or business of any kind . . . is to that extent void.”).
12. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16601; OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 218; N.D. CENT. CODE § 908-06(1).
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holders against a corporation.13 However, despite over 100 years of
social, political, and economic change, these three states otherwise
maintain their ban of noncompete agreements to this day.14
B. The New Wave: Jimmy John’s and the Ban of Low-Wage
Noncompete Agreements
As for the other states that do enforce noncompete agreements,
their various noncompete laws and policies have gradually and
uniquely evolved overtime, yet a recent and rapid wave of reform
has emerged over the past ten years.15 Since 2011, twenty-eight
states and the District of Columbia have changed their noncompete
laws to some extent.16 Some have codified per se unreasonable
noncompete requirements.17 Others, including Virginia,18 have
implemented certain notice requirements to employees of the
presence of a noncompete clause.19 Others have carved out
exceptions banning the use of noncompete agreements in
particular fields. Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, and West Virginia have banned or at least limited
noncompetes for physicians, nurses, and/or other healthcare
employees.20 In 2015, Hawaii banned the use of noncompete agreements in its technology industry.21
One of the stronger trends in recent years has been the banning
of noncompetes against certain low-wage employees. Employee
noncompete agreements came under nationwide scrutiny in 2014
following the discovery that the sandwich chain, Jimmy John’s,
had been including noncompete clauses in the employment agree-

13. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16602–02.5; OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 219; N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 9-08-06(2).
14. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (Deering 2022); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 217 (2022);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2022).
15. See generally Russell Beck, Curious Which States Have Changed Their Noncompete
Laws in the Last Decade? (More than Half), FAIR COMPETITION L. (July 12, 2022),
https://faircompetitionlaw.com/2022/07/12/curious-which-states-have-changed-theirnoncompete-laws-in-the-last-decade-more-than-half/ [https://perma.cc/JW7D-BMV6].
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.7:8 (2021); see infra Section I.D.3.
19. See Beck, supra note 15.
20. See id.
21. HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-4(d) (2022).
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ments for its sandwich makers.22 The contract, in relevant part,
required the following:
Employee covenants and agrees that, during his or her employment
with Employer and for a period of two (2) years after either the
effective date of termination of his or her employment for any reason,
whether voluntary or involuntary and whether by Employer or
Employee, or the date on which Employee begins to comply with this
paragraph, whichever is later, he or she will not have any direct or
indirect interest in or perform services for (whether as an owner,
partner, investor, director, officer, representative, manager,
employee, principal, agent, advisor, or consultant) any business which
derives more than ten percent (10%) of its revenue from selling
submarine, hero-type, deli-style, pita and/or wrapped or rolled
sandwiches and is located within three miles of either (1) [address of
applicable Jimmy John’s restaurant] or (2) any such other JIMMY
JOHN’S® Sandwich Shop operated by [Jimmy John’s Franchise,
LLC], one of its authorized franchisees, or any of [its] affiliates.23

In other words, the Jimmy John’s contract provided that a
sixteen-year-old high school student earning minimum wage as a
sandwich maker at a Jimmy John’s location near their home, for
two years after leaving said job, could not accept another minimum
wage job at a Subway—or any other restaurant, grocery store, or
other business selling a sufficient amount of sandwiches—within
three miles, not just of the Jimmy John’s at which the student
worked, but of any Jimmy John’s in the country. There are over
2,000 Jimmy John’s locations, allowing this noncompete clause to
cover a geographic scope of 6,000 square miles across 44 states and
the District of Columbia.24
Jimmy John’s received heavy criticism and removed the clause
from its employment agreements following a settlement agreement
in Illinois state court.25 But they were just the tip of the iceberg. In
2016, the Obama Administration published a report finding
rampant abuse of noncompete clauses in low-wage employee

22. Dave Jamieson, Jimmy John’s Makes Low-Wage Workers Sign ‘Oppressive’
Noncompete Agreements, HUFFPOST, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/13/jimmyjohns-non-compete_n_5978180.html [perm.cc/27F5-HQJU] (Oct. 15, 2014).
23. First Amended Class Action Complaint at 59–60, Brunner v. Liautaud, No. 14-C5509 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2014).
24. Jamieson, supra note 22.
25. Daniel Wiessner, Jimmy John’s Settles Illinois Lawsuit Over Non-Compete
Agreements, REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-jimmyjohns-settlement/jimmyjohns-settles-illinois-lawsuit-over-non-compete-agreements-idUSKBN13W2JA
[https://perma.cc/JR4M-Y3KU] (Dec. 7, 2016, 1:55 PM).
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contracts.26 The reports revealed that nearly one in five U.S.
employees—and one in six U.S. employees without a college
degree—were bound by a noncompete agreement.27 The Obama
Administration subsequently issued a Call to Action for the states
to review their noncompete laws and policies, stating:
While the primary rationale of non-competes is to prevent workers
from transferring trade secrets to rival companies, a considerable
proportion come at the expense of workers, entrepreneurship, and the
broader economy. Researchers have found that states that strictly
enforce non-compete agreements have lower wage growth and lower
mobility than states that do not enforce them. . . .
....
. . . Even in states that choose to enforce non-competes, we have
heard from experts that only in rare cases is a non-compete the best
option for an employer to use, over and above the host of other legal
frameworks – including trade secrets protections, non-solicitation
agreements, and non-disclosure agreements. As states move to ensure
free labor market competition, non-compete reform should be
considered as one important tool.28

In the years that followed, ten states passed legislation banning
enforcement of noncompete agreements with low-wage employees,
though with various thresholds for determining “low-wage.”29
Virginia was one such state.30

26. See generally THE WHITE HOUSE, NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS: ANALYSIS OF THE
USAGE, POTENTIAL ISSUES, AND STATE RESPONSES (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.arch
ives.gov/sites/default/files/non-competes_report_final2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SEL-GN3X].
27. Id. at 3; see also Steven Greenhouse, Noncompete Clauses Increasingly Pop Up in
Array of Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/business/noncompeteclauses-increasingly-pop-up-in-array-of-jobs.html [https://perma.cc/87LQ-MWSW] (June 8,
2014).
28. THE WHITE HOUSE, STATE CALL TO ACTION TO NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS (2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/competition/noncompetescalltoaction-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/AN4Q-MA24].
29. These ten states are Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New
Hampshire, Oregon, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Washington. Russell Beck, “Low-Wage”
Employees Are Now Exempt From 10 Noncompete Laws. Who Are These Employees and
Where Are They Exempt?, FAIR COMPETITION L., https://faircompetitionlaw.com/2021/
06/19/low-wage-employees-are-now-exempt-from-10-noncompete-laws-who-are-theseemployees-and-where-are-they-exempt/#fn1 [https://perma.cc/DF9L-XGYQ] (June 19,
2021).
30. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.7:8 (2021); see infra Section I.D.3.

SULLIVAN MASTER COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

244

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

11/30/2022 10:55 AM

[Vol. 57:235

C. The First in 116 Years: The District of Columbia Bans
Noncompetes
Despite the past decade’s wave of noncompete reform, no
jurisdiction had joined North Dakota, California, and Oklahoma in
banning employee noncompete agreements in general—until 2021.
On January 11, 2021, D.C. Act 23-563, the Ban on Non-Compete
Agreements Amendment Act of 2020, was signed into law,
prohibiting any private District of Columbia employer from
requiring a noncompete agreement with any District of Columbia
employee—with very limited exceptions.31 It was the first
categorical ban of noncompete agreements since Michigan in
1905.32 In its report supporting the bill, the Council of the District
of Columbia Committee on Labor and Workforce Development
stated that “non-competes are fundamentally anti-competitive.”33
It explained how banning employee noncompete agreements would
help fuel the economy by increasing employee job mobility as well
as strengthening the pool of job candidates, thus benefitting
employees and employers alike:
If a worker covered by a non-compete has a new idea for a company,
they may be unable to start their business here in the District because
of the non-compete, and could be forced to move out of the region.
Banning non-compete clauses therefore will help workers improve
their lives, help companies secure better talent, and foster a stronger
start-up culture.34

Originally, the District of Columbia attempted to join the ten
other jurisdictions banning noncompete agreements for low-wage
employees.35 A prior version of Council Bill 23-0494 limited the ban
to employees who earn less than or equal to three times the
minimum wage.36 Only eight of the thirteen District of Columbia

31. 68 D.C. Reg. 782 (Jan. 11, 2021). Those exceptions were volunteers, religious
leaders, medical providers earning at least $250,000 per year, and babysitters. Id.
32. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.761 (1905), repealed by Michigan Antitrust Reform Act
(MARA), id. § 445.774a (2022).
33. COMM. ON LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV., COUNCIL OF D.C., REPORT ON B23-0494: THE
BAN ON NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 2020, at 2 (2020), https://lims.dccouncil.gov/
downloads/LIMS/43373/Committee_Report/B23-0494-Committee_Report2.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/2WKJ-GL9N].
34. Id.
35. Ban on Non-Compete Agreements Amendment Act of 2019, B. 23-0494 (D.C. 2019),
https://lims.dccouncil.gov/downloads/LIMS/43373/Introduction/B23-0494-Introduction.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NAQ4-9QZC].
36. Id.
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council members supported the bill,37 but not because it went too
far—because it did not go far enough. The revised version of the
bill banning all employee noncompete agreements was approved
unanimously by the Council (with the exception of one recusal).38
The Committee on Labor and Workforce Development explained
how the half-measure of banning noncompete agreements just for
low-wage employees would result in administrative expense and
uncertainty for employers and would fail to address the concerns
of restricted job mobility and applicant pools that noncompete
agreements raise for high-salary positions:
It is simpler, fairer, more practical, and more enforceable to have a
complete ban on non-competes. Non-competes are used across various
wage tiers, and non-competes are harmful to workers at all salary
levels, as well as to the local economy. If an average hourly wage was
set as the threshold, employers of salaried workers would have to
record those employees’ hours of work and regularly calculate the
hourly wages earned to ensure that they comply with the law. The DC
Chamber of Commerce objected to this administrative burden for
businesses that relied on salaried workers. At the same time, many
professions where non-competes are the most harmful, such as the
medical profession, would likely be above any such wage threshold.
Further, all workers, even those earning a higher salary, should be
entitled to change jobs.39

Learning from the legislative history of the noncompete bans in
North Dakota, Oklahoma, and California, the District of Columbia
preemptively excluded certain restrictive covenants from its ban—
namely, confidentiality agreements and sale of business
agreements.40
Nonetheless, the ban met backlash for still being overly broad.41
The Committee on Labor and Workforce Development met with
business leaders and, while remaining adamant of its disfavor of

37. See id.
38. B23-0494 - Ban on Non-Compete Agreements Amendment Act of 2019, COUNCIL OF
D.C., https://lims.dccouncil.gov/Legislation/B23-0494 [perma.cc/5A2L-64RP] (navigate to
“Dec 15, 2020” and click “View Voting Details”).
39. COMM. ON LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV., supra note 33, at 2–3.
40. 68 D.C. Reg. 782 (Jan. 15, 2021).
41. See COMM. ON LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV., COUNCIL OF D.C., REPORT ON B24-256, THE
NON-COMPETE CLARIFICATION AMENDMENT ACT OF 2022, at 2 (2022), https://lims.d
ccouncil.gov/downloads/LIMS/47234/Committee_Report/B24-0256-Committee_Report1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C356-VJ4K]; D.C. Council Amends Non-Compete Law After Backlash –
What Employers Need to Know Before October 1, FISHER PHILLIPS, https://www.fisherphillip
s.com/news-insights/dc-council-amends-non-compete-law-after-backlash-what-employersneed-to-know-before-october-1.html [https://perma.cc/Z75B-TVKK] (Sept. 13, 2022).
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noncompete agreements, compromised “[i]n the spirit of comity”42
to “clarify”43 the district’s noncompete ban. Most notably, the
District of Columbia has since excluded “highly compensated
employees” from its ban—an almost inverse policy to those of the
jurisdictions that have banned noncompetes for low-wage
employees.44 In the District of Columbia, noncompete agreements
are once again enforceable against employees who earn at least
$150,000 per year, effective October 1, 2022.45
D. Noncompete Law in Virginia
1. Virginia’s Three-Pronged Test
Virginia enforces noncompete agreements,46 though it has
historically disfavored them47—especially over the past twenty
years.48 Throughout the commonwealth’s history, it has recognized
the importance of allowing businesses to protect their interests and
has accepted that noncompete agreements serve as a valuable tool
to provide “business stability insurance.”49 That said, Virginia
courts will refuse to enforce a noncompete agreement if it
constitutes an unreasonable restraint on trade.50 Virginia has
evaluated the reasonableness of noncompete agreements using the
same three considerations since 1956:
(1) Is the restraint, from the standpoint of the employer, reasonable
in the sense that it is no greater than is necessary to protect the
employer in some legitimate business interest? (2) From the
standpoint of the employee, is the restraint reasonable in the sense
that it is not unduly harsh and oppressive in curtailing his legitimate

42. COMM. ON LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV., supra note 41, at 2.
43. 69 D.C. Reg. 9910 (Aug. 5, 2022).
44. Id.
45. Id. The exception allowing noncompete agreements for medical providers earning
at least $250,000 per year still remains. Id.
46. See generally Ann R. Bergan, Kenneth E. Chadwick, Hugh T. Harrison II & Barrett
E. Pope, Note, Employee Covenants Not To Compete: Where Does Virginia Stand?, 15 U.
RICH. L. REV. 105 (1980); Robert A. Hill, Covenants Not-To-Compete: Are They Enforceable
in Virginia?, 16 VA. BAR ASS’N J. 4 (1990).
47. Bergan et al., supra note 46, at 106.
48. See infra notes 65–69 and accompanying text.
49. Bergan et al., supra note 46, at 106, 108.
50. Id. at 106.
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efforts to earn a livelihood? (3) Is the restraint reasonable from the
standpoint of a sound public policy?51

First, the restraint must be no greater than necessary to protect
a legitimate business interest. When determining the presence of
a legitimate business interest, Virginia courts look to the nature of
the employer’s business as well as the role the employee played in
the business.52 The burden is on the employer to “show special
circumstances which make it unfair for him to bear all the risks of
placing the employee in a position in which a later breach of
confidence might be costly.”53 Historically, Virginia has enforced
noncompete agreements for the sake of two areas it has deemed
legitimate business interests: customer lists and trade secrets.54
Second, the restraint must not unduly obstruct the employee
from earning a living. It is under this prong that Virginia courts
have scrutinized the reasonableness of a noncompete agreement’s
scope, with respect to time, territory, and activity.55 If a
noncompete agreement has a lengthy duration, wide geographic
“black-out” area, or defines “competition” in broad terms, it
unreasonably limits the employee’s options to sustain a
livelihood.56 Virginia imposes no bright-lines for determining
unreasonable scope, such as a particular length of time or mile
radius.57 The best guidance employees, employers, and practitioners have to evaluate current noncompete agreements is to
compare them with the ones previously evaluated by the courts.58

51. Meissel v. Finley, 198 Va. 577, 580, 95 S.E.2d 186, 188 (1956) (quoting Welcome
Wagon, Inc. v. Morris, 224 F.2d 693, 698 (4th Cir. 1955)).
52. See, e.g., Paramount Termite Control Co. v. Rector, 238 Va. 171, 174, 380 S.E.2d
922, 924 (1989); Stoneman v. Wilson, 169 Va. 239, 247, 192 S.E. 816, 819 (1937) (citing
Brandenburger v. Martin, 225 Ill. App. 439 (1922).
53. Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 651
(1960).
54. See, e.g., Paramount Termite Control, 238 Va. at 175, 380 S.E.2d at 925–26; Foti v.
Cook, 220 Va. 800, 805–06, 263 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1980); Stoneman, 169 Va. at 245–46, 192
S.E. at 818–19.
55. See, e.g., Paramount Termite Control, 238 Va. at 175, 380 S.E.2d at 925–26; Grant
v. Carotek, Inc., 737 F.2d 410, 412 (4th Cir. 1984); Power Distrib., Inc. v. Emergency Power
Eng’g, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 54, 54–55 (E.D. Va. 1983); Roanoke Eng’g Sales Co., Inc. v.
Rosenbaum, 223 Va. 548, 290 S.E.2d 882 (1982); Richardson v. Paxton Co., 203 Va. 790, 127
S.E.2d 113 (1962).
56. See cases cited supra note 55.
57. See Foti, 220 Va. At 805, 263 S.E.2d at 433.
58. See generally VA. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE AND THE
DUTY OF LOYALTY IN VIRGINIA (2012).
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Third, the restraint must be reasonable with respect to a balance
of public policy. While protecting legitimate business interests is
an important goal of public policy, “[d]iametrically opposed to the
freedom of contract is the freedom of trade.”59 Virginia balances the
interests of both to ensure healthy competition as well as economic
growth, an ultimate benefit both to employee and employer.60
2. The Supreme Court of Virginia’s Love-Hate History with
Noncompete Agreements
By the 1990s, the Supreme Court of Virginia was consistently
upholding noncompete agreements of varying levels of restriction.61 In Blue Ridge Anesthesia and Critical Care, Inc. v. Gidick,
the court upheld a noncompete agreement with a duration of three
years.62 In New River Media Group, Inc. v. Knighton, the court
upheld a noncompete agreement with a geographic scope of sixty
miles.63
Regardless of one’s agreement with these decisions, they at least
brought about a relative amount of certainty to the common-law
boundaries of noncompete agreements in Virginia.64 At the turn of
the millennium, however, the court so turned its opinion of

59. Hill, supra note 46, at 8.
60. Id.; see also Worrie v. Boze, 191 Va. 916, 928, 62 S.E.2d 876, 882 (1951) (“Freedom
to contract must not be unreasonably abridged. Neither must the right to protect by
reasonable restrictions that which a man by industry, skill, and good judgment has built up
be denied.” (citing Granger v. Craven, 199 N.W. 10, 12 (1924))).
61. See, e.g., Paramount Termite Control Co. v. Rector, 238 Va. 171, 380 S.E.2d 922
(1989); Blue Ridge Anesthesia & Critical Care Inc. v. Gidick, 239 Va. 369, 389 S.E.2d 467
(1990); Therapy Servs. Inc. v. Crystal City Nursing Ctr. Inc., 239 Va. 385, 389 S.E.2d 710
(1990); New River Media Grp. Inc. v. Knighton, 245 Va. 367, 429 S.E.2d 25 (1993); Rash v.
Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co.,251 Va. 281, 467 S.E.2d 791 (1996); Advanced Marine Enters.
Inc. v. PRC Inc., 256 Va. 106, 501 S.E.2d 148 (1998).
62. Blue Ridge Anesthesia & Critical Care Inc., 239 Va. at 370–71, 389 S.E.2d at 468,
470; see also Paramount Termite Control, 238 Va. at 172–73, 176, 380 S.E.2d at 924, 926
(upholding a noncompete agreement with a duration of two years).
63. New River Media Grp. Inc., 245 Va. at 368, 370, 429 S.E.2d at 25, 26–27. For
perspective, a sixty air-mile radius around Richmond, Virginia, would cover as far north as
Fredericksburg, as far east as Newport News, as far west as Charlottesville, and nearly as
far south as the southern border of Virginia. See Draw a Circle, MAP DEVS.,
https://www.mapdevel opers.com/draw-circle-tool.php [https://perma.cc/5YR9-TRFV] (enter
“Richmond, VA” into the “Address” field and “60” into the “Radius” field; select “Miles”; and
click “New Circle”).
64. Gregory J. Haley & Scott C. Ford, In Search of Whales, Not Minnows: Casting the
Noncompete Net After Omniplex, 54 VA. LAW. 28, 28–29 (2006).
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noncompete agreements.65 In Simmons v. Miller, the court deemed
unenforceable a noncompete agreement with, among other
problematic restrictions, a duration of three years—the same
duration as the noncompete agreement previously upheld in Blue
Ridge Anesthesia.66 In Motion Control Systems, Inc. v. East, the
court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that a noncompete
agreement was unenforceable solely because it vaguely prohibited
competition in “any business similar to the type of business” of the
employer.67 The fact that the noncompete agreement also covered
a 100-mile radius68 was not identified as problematic by the trial
court and not addressed by the Supreme Court of Virginia.69
In Omniplex World Services Corp. v. US Investigations Services,
Inc., the court, by a four-to-three vote, held unenforceable a
noncompete agreement for a low-level administrative employee.70
The agreement had a duration of one year starting, not from the
employee’s termination date, but from the employee’s start date.71
In other words, so long as the employee worked for the employer
for more than one year, there would be no noncompete restriction
upon termination.72 The noncompete agreement also restricted the
employee from working for a competitor, not in general service to
any of that competitor’s customers, but just in service to one
particular client of the employer: a confidential government
agency.73 Finally, the noncompete agreement also only applied to
employment in which the employee would have the same level of
security clearance with the competitor as she had with her original
65. See Simmons v. Miller, 261 Va. 561, 580–82, 544 S.E.2d 666, 678 (2001); Motion
Control Sys., Inc. v. East, 262 Va. 33, 35–36, 38, 546 S.E.2d 424, 425–26 (2001); Modern
Env’ts, Inc. v. Stinnett, 263 Va. 491, 493–96, 561 S.E.2d 694, 695–96 (2002); Parr v.
Alderwoods Grp., Inc., 268 Va. 461, 464, 466, 468, 604 S.E.2d 431, 433–35 (2004).
66. Compare Simmons, 261 Va. at 580–82, 544 S.E.2d at 678 (holding that a
noncompete agreement with a duration of three years was not enforceable), with Blue Ridge
Anesthesia & Critical Care Inc., 239 Va. at 370–71, 374, 389 S.E.2d at 468, 470 (holding that
a noncompete agreement with a duration of three years was enforceable).
67. 262 Va. at 35–38, 546 S.E.2d at 425–26.
68. For perspective, a 100 air-mile radius around Richmond, Virginia, would cover as
far north as Washington, D.C., as far east as Virginia Beach, as far west as Lynchburg, and
nearly as far south as Durham, North Carolina. See Draw a Circle, MAP DEVS.,
https://www.mapdevelopers.com/draw-circle-tool.php [https://perma.cc/5YR9-TRFV] (enter
“Richmond, VA” into the “Address” field and “100” into the “Radius” field; select “Miles”;
and click “New Circle”).
69. Motion Control Sys., 262 Va. at 36–38, 546 S.E.2d at 425–26.
70. 270 Va. 246, 250, 618 S.E.2d 340, 343 (2005).
71. Id. at 248, 618 S.E.2d at 341.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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employer.74 Nonetheless, the court held that the noncompete
agreement was unenforceable because it prohibited “support of any
kind” to the particular client and thus did not limit its restriction
to “competing directly” with the employer.75
The Omniplex court ruled that any noncompete agreement
“must be evaluated on its own merits, balancing the provisions of
the contract with the circumstances of the businesses and
employees involved.”76 Gregory J. Haley and Scott C. Ford
theorized that this ruling gave rise to a phenomenon they coined
as “Omniplexity,” in which the court gave weight to “intangible
factors” outside legitimate business interest, undue hardship, and
public policy.77 One such factor is on which side of the
“villain/victim” dichotomy the employee lies in the facts of any
given case.78 In Omniplex, for example, the employee was low-level,
had applied to the competitor before agreeing to work for the
employer, and had the requisite security clearance prior to taking
either job.79 This was a much more sympathetic employee before
the court than those, for instance, in Advanced Marine Enterprises
Inc. v. PRC Inc., a case in which the court upheld a noncompete
agreement that was violated when an entire department of
employees secretly plotted to resign from their employer en masse
and take their business to the employer’s competitor.80 The
Omniplex decision made clear that the Supreme Court of Virginia
evaluates the enforceability of noncompete agreements on case-bycase, totality of the circumstances basis. As discussed below, this
has led to surprising, unpredictable results in the court’s
enforcement of noncompete agreements.

74. Id.
75. Id. at 249–50, 618 S.E.2d at 342–43. This argument is colloquially known as the
“Janitor Rule,” referring to unenforceable noncompete agreements that are so overly broad
in the type of services restricted that the employee could not even work for a competitor as
its janitor. See The Janitor Rule Mops Up Another Non-Compete Agreement, OTTINGER EMP.
LAWS. (July 4, 2018), https://www.ottingerlaw.com/blog/the-janitor-rule-mops-up-anothernon-compete-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/7QB9-9UTG].
76. Omniplex, 270 Va at 249, 618 S.E.2d at 342.
77. Haley & Ford, supra note 64, at 30.
78. Id.
79. Id.; Omniplex, 270 Va. at 247–48, 618 S.E.2d at 341.
80. Haley & Ford, supra note 64, at 29; Advanced Marine Enters. Inc. v. PRC Inc., 256
Va. 106, 501 S.E.2d 148 (1998).
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3. Virginia’s Recent Legislative Reform
Virginia has contributed to the recent wave of legislative reform
over the past decade.81 On April 9, 2020, Governor Ralph Northam
signed Senate Bill 480 into law, adding new section 40.1-28.7:8 to
the Code of Virginia.82 The section follows the nationwide trend of
banning noncompete agreements for low-wage employees.83
Virginia provides the following—rather onerous84—definition for a
“[l]ow-wage employee” exempt from noncompete agreements:
An employee whose average weekly earnings, calculated by dividing
the employee’s earnings during the period of 52 weeks immediately
preceding the date of termination of employment by 52, or if an
employee worked fewer than 52 weeks, by the number of weeks that
the employee was actually paid during the 52-week period, are less
than the average weekly wage of the Commonwealth as determined
pursuant to subsection B of § 65.2-500.85

Section 65.2-500(B) provides that Virginia’s average weekly
wage is calculated as follows:
On or before January 1 of each year, the total wages, excluding wages
of United States government employees, reported on contribution
reports to the Virginia Employment Commission for the 12-month
period ending the preceding June 30 shall be divided by the average
monthly number of insured workers (determined by dividing the total
insured workers reported for that 12-month period by 12). The
average annual wage thus obtained shall be divided by 52 and the
average weekly wage thus determined rounded to the nearest dollar.
The average weekly wage as so determined shall be applicable for the
full period during which income benefits are payable, when the date
of occurrence of injury or of disablement in the case of disease falls
within the year commencing with the July 1 following the date of
determination.86

In simpler terms, a “low-wage employee” in Virginia is currently
considered one who makes less than $1,105 per week, or $57,460

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.7:8 (2021).
2020 Va. Acts ch. 949 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.7:7 (2021)).
See Beck, supra note 29.
See infra Section II.B.2.
VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.7:8(A) (2021).
Id. § 65.2-500(B) (Cum Supp. 2022).
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per year.87 However, these figures are subject to constant change
due to Virginia’s variable definition.88
Section 40.1-28.7:8(B) states, “No employer shall enter into,
enforce, or threaten to enforce a covenant not to compete with any
low-wage employee.”89 Any employer that violates Section 40.128.7:8(B) faces a $10,000 penalty per violation, in addition to the
reasonable attorney fees of the employee.90
In an attempt to address the lopsided bargaining power inherent
in low-wage employee agreements, Virginia also now requires an
employer to post a copy or summary of Section 40.1-28.7:8
anywhere other state- or federal-mandated employee notices must
be posted.91 Failure to post adequate notice of the low-wage
noncompete ban results in an written warning for the first
violation, a $250 penalty for the second violation, and a penalty up
to $1,000 for the third and each subsequent violation.92
II. WHY VIRGINIA SHOULD BAN EMPLOYEE NONCOMPETE
AGREEMENTS
Virginia should categorically ban employee noncompete
agreements for two reasons. First, whatever short-term benefits
noncompete agreements may—unnecessarily93—provide local
businesses, they are outweighed by the negative effects on
employees’ freedom of trade and the growth of a local economy in
general. The growth, stagnation, and decline of other relevant
jurisdictions demonstrate how a ban of employee noncompete
agreements would see an overall economic surge for Virginia.
Second, current Virginia law inadequately addresses the negative consequences of noncompete agreements. It results in an unpredictable minefield for employees and employers to aimlessly
navigate, whereas a general, simple ban of employee noncompete
agreements would remove all uncertainty.
87. Virginia Average Weekly Earnings of All Employees: Total Private, YCHARTS (Oct.
19, 2022), https://ycharts.com/indicators/virginia_average_weekly_earnings_of_all_employ
ees_total_private_unadjusted [https://perma.cc/6MYG-ZJRN].
88. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40.1-28.7:8(A), 65.2-500(B) (2021 & Cum. Supp. 2022).
89. Id. § 40.1-28.7:8(B) (2021).
90. Id. § 40.1-28.7:8(E)–(F) (2021).
91. Id. § 40.1-28.7:8(G) (2021).
92. Id.
93. See infra Section III.A.
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A. Banning Employee Noncompete Agreements Would Strengthen
Virginia’s Economy and Job Market
Employee noncompete agreements have been shown to depress
wages, inhibit entrepreneurship, and deplete job markets.94
Conversely, banning noncompete agreements have been shown to
increase employee earning power up to 21%.95 A ban would
likewise improve employee mobility. By 2021, Hawaii saw an
increase in technology employee mobility of 11% following its 2015
ban of noncompetes for those workers.96 While some may claim
noncompete agreements are critical to protecting the legitimate
business interests of employers,97 “it is not even clear that
enforcing employee covenants not to compete generates social
benefits in excess of its social costs.”98 Noncompete agreements
deter economic growth by hindering competition, reducing job
mobility, declining innovation, preventing the creation of new
businesses, and encouraging investor migration.99 Additionally, a
2010 study found that noncompete agreements actually reduce an
employee’s incentive to “invest in their work performance” for their
current employer.100 Of the employees bound by noncompete
agreements who leave their employer, a 2012 study found that 25%
had to change industries, resulting in “reduced compensation,
atrophy of their skills, and estrangement from their professional
networks.”101
Two case studies demonstrate how banning noncompetes, and
subsequently increasing the earning power and mobility of
employees, can benefit a regions economy in general. First, one can
look to the meteoric rise of the technology industry in California’s
94. See generally Michael Lipsitz & Evan Starr, Low-Wage Workers and the
Enforceability of Non-Compete Agreements, 68 MGMT. SCI. 143 (2021).
95. Id.
96. David J. Balan, Labor Non-Compete Agreements: Tool for Economic Efficiency, or
Means to Extract Value from Workers? 3 (Jan. 20, 2021) (working paper) (on file with the
Washington Center for Equitable Growth).
97. See infra Section III.A.
98. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 371 (2003).
99. See generally On Amir & Orly Lobel, Driving Performance: A Growth Theory of Noncompete Law, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 833 (2013).
100. On Amir & Orly Lobel, Innovation Motivation: Behavioral Effects of PostEmployment Restrictions 35 (Univ. of Cal. San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 10-32, 2010).
101. Matt Marx & Lee Fleming, Non-Compete Agreements: Barriers to Entry…and Exit?,
in 12 NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RSCH., INNOVATION POLICY & ECONOMY 39, 48 (Josh Lenner &
Scott Stern eds., 2012).

SULLIVAN MASTER COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

254

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

11/30/2022 10:55 AM

[Vol. 57:235

Silicon Valley, a region that does not enforce noncompete agreements. Second, one can look to the innovation decline in Michigan
after that jurisdiction repealed its noncompete ban in 1985.
1. The Rise of California
It is no secret that California’s Silicon Valley has been the hub
of United States technology companies for the past several
decades, serving as the home of companies like Google, Twitter,
Zoom, Uber, and many others.102 Yet with employee noncompete
agreements banned in California since 1872,103 it can be difficult to
examine just how significant a role the ban played in California’s
economic growth. The best way, as many scholars have done, is to
compare Silicon Valley with other regions who have never had such
a ban in place. When doing so, one finds, “relative to regions that
enforce non-compete covenants, an increase in the local supply of
[venture capitalists] in states that restrict the enforcement of
noncompetes has significantly stronger positive effects on the
number of patents, the number of firm starts, and the employment
rate than it does in states that do enforce noncompetes.”104
AnnaLee Saxenian made such a comparison between the rise of
Silicon Valley and the ultimate decline of the technological hub of
Boston around Massachusetts Route 128.105 Saxenian attributed
the difference to culture.106 Whereas Silicon Valley had a culture
of openness, risk-seeking, employee mobility, and horizontal
growth, Route 128 had a culture of secrecy, risk aversion,
traditional corporate structure, and vertical growth.107
Subsequently, the former saw high levels of employee mobility and
knowledge spillover that lead to collective growth in knowledge
and innovation.108 In contrast, the latter saw little knowledge
102. Grace Maral Burnett, ANALYSIS: Silicon Valley M&A, Investments Climbed
Higher in 2021, BL (May 18, 2022, 8:41 AM), https://news.bloomberg law.com/bloomberglaw-analysis/analysis-8?utm_medium=pr&utm_source=prnewswire [https://perma.cc/4KH
G-VC7E.
103. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (2022).
104. Amir & Lobel, supra note 99, at 860 (citing Sampsa Samila & Olav Sorenson,
Noncompete Covenants: Incentives to Innovate or Impediments to Growth, 57 MGMT. SCI.
425, 430, 436–37 (2011)).
105. See generally ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND
COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994).
106. Id. at 111–17.
107. Id. at 20–27, 59–78.
108. Id. at 20–27.
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spillover and companies subsequently struggling to innovate and
adapt to changing market conditions outside their area of
experience.109
In an article that has since been cited by numerous noncompete
law scholars, Ronald J. Gilson responded to Saxenian and
explained that the cultures of Silicon Valley and Route 128 were
not the cause of their respective growth and decline, but they were
rather just symptoms of the true cause: the areas’ differing legal
infrastructures.110 More specifically, Gilson attributed the
different cultures and economies of Silicon Valley and Route 128 to
the fact that employee noncompete agreements were banned in the
former and not the latter.111 As Gilson explained, “the legal rules
governing employee mobility are a causal antecedent of Saxenian’s
construction of a Silicon Valley business culture that supports job
hopping and a Route 128 business culture that discourages it. The
legal rules are one of the poles around which the shape of the
business is formed.”112
It is of course unlikely the case that California’s noncompete ban
is the root of all of Silicon Valley’s success. Gilson himself stated as
much. He acknowledged that California’s noncompete ban was by
no means an intentional change to boost the economy.113 He
accordingly cautioned other jurisdictions against hastily adopting
a noncompete ban with the hope of it solely lighting the match to a
boom in its respective technology industry.114 Rather, he advised
other jurisdictions to consider the needs distinct to their locale,
economies, and communities before altering their respective
employment laws.115
However, the balancing of needs to which Gilson referred
involved the benefits of knowledge spillover from employee
mobility with the “reciprocal reduction in the incentive for
intellectual property investment that results from the dilution of
employers’ property rights.”116 In other words, Gilson feared that
109. Id. at 59–78.
110. Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 578 (1999).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 627–28.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 627.
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banning employee noncompete agreements comes at the loss of
intellectual property protection and the industry-wide benefits it
provides.117 He claimed that this was a sacrifice Silicon Valley was
willing to make, but one that not all regions should.118 Such a
sacrifice, however, is not necessary. As explained in greater detail
below,119 noncompete agreements protect interests divisible from
those protected by intellectual property. Banning employee noncompete agreements in Virginia will in no way interfere with an
employers’ ability to nonetheless protect its patents, trade secrets,
customer lists, trademarks, and copyrights through confidentiality agreements, nonsolicitiation agreements, registrations, and
licenses.
Jason Wood expanded on the studies of Saxenian and Gilson—
comparing not just Silicon Valley and Route 128, but Austin,
Texas, and the Research Triangle Park of North Carolina as well—
to conclude that the presence of a noncompete ban may not have
as much predictive value as Gilson first suggested.120 He explained
that, despite Silicon Valley’s unparalleled growth, these other
regions have been enjoying their own degree of economic success,
despite the enforcement of noncompete agreements.121 Each region
has benefitted from nearby networks of renowned technology
universities and companies as well as venture capital investors.122
Jonathan M. Barnett and Ted Sichelman likewise suggested
alternative explanations for Silicon Valley’s success, including
warm weather, luck, and leadership in general-purpose
technologies like microprocessors.123
This Article does not claim that a ban of employee noncompete
agreements in Virginia will serve as a cure-all for its economy and
instantly transform it into the next Silicon Valley. If it were that
easy, it would hardly have taken this long for other jurisdictions to
catch on. No, other measures surely factor into a region’s
technological and economic growth beyond restrict covenants, such
117. Id. at 627–28.
118. Id.
119. See infra Section III.A.
120. Jason S. Wood, A Comparison of the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete and
Recent Economic Histories of Four High Technology Regions, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 14, 44
(2000).
121. Id. at 58.
122. Id. at 37–43.
123. Jonathan M. Barnett & Ted Sichelman, The Case for Noncompetes, 87 U. CHI. L.
REV. 953, 1001 (2020).
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as the presence and cultivation of a strong angel investor community, favorable zoning laws, friendly local and statewide laws,
and a strong technology talent base.
However, this Article does posit that California’s ban of employee noncompete agreements has contributed to its undeniable
success. While Wood pointed out that regions like Route 128,
Austin, Texas, and the Research Triangle Park of North Carolina
have enjoyed their own amounts of economic success, he cannot
dispute that Silicon Valley far and away leads the technology
industry.124 The changes Wood witnessed were more likely
attributable to a nationwide transition into a technology-heavy
economy. Yet despite signs that the rest of the country is catching
up, it remains true that the technology boom began, and remains
spearheaded by, Silicon Valley. California’s ban of employee
noncompete agreements likely contributed to the technology
industry’s rise, or at the very least did not hinder it. And while
Barnett and Sichelman casted doubt on the noncompete ban’s
connection with Silicon Valley’s success, one should be more
skeptical of the significantly more attentuated principles of
weather and luck as alternative explanations. Accordingly, this
Article believes likewise banning employee noncompete agreements in Virginia will accelerate its economic growth and allow it
to catch up to Silicon Valley’s success ahead of other jurisdictions.
2. The Fall of Michigan
With North Dakota, California, and Oklahoma first banning
noncompete agreements in the nineteenth century,125 there is
unfortunately no reliable before-and-after comparisons to be made
in an effort to analyze the impact those bans had on their
respective economies. Also, while the 2021 ban in the District of
Columbia will surely prove to be a fascinating case study for the
years to come, it did not come into effect until October 2022 (on
account of the backlash and subsequent amendments),126 and there
is therefore insufficient data to analyze its results at this time.
However, while we do not have a relevant case study to examine
the positive impact banning noncompete agreements may have, we
124. Id. at 58; Burnett, supra note 102.
125. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1673 (Deering 1872); OKLA. STAT. ch. 17, § 886 (1890); TERR. D.
REV. CODE 1877, CIV. CODE, § 959 (1877).
126. 69 D.C. Reg. 9910 (Aug. 5, 2022).
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do have the opposite: a case study suggesting the negative impact
of repealing a noncompete ban. Michigan was previously the fourth
U.S. jurisdiction to ban noncompete agreements.127 In 1985,
Michigan repealed its eighty-year-old ban.128
In 2009, the Harvard Business School Department of Research
conducted a study comparing the inventor market in Michigan
both before and after 1985.129 The study discussed how, shortly
after the 1905 ban, Michigan’s auto industry boomed, similarly to
the technology industry in Silicon Valley, with 500 new firms by
1915.130 By examining the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s
patent database and comparing changes in inventor mobility from
pre- and post-1985 Michigan with the corresponding data of states
that did not enforce noncompete laws—and controlling for the
overall downturn of Michigan’s essential automobile industry as a
result of foreign competition—the study “identifies non-compete
enforcement as a critical institutional determinant of employee
mobility.”131 It found an 8.1% drop in mobility among employees
outside automobile firms, a 15.4% drop in mobility for employees
with human capital specific to automobile firms, and a 16.2% drop
in mobility for “highly tech-nologically specialized” employees.132
The study accordingly concluded, “[t]he effects, both statistically
and economically significant, support Gilson’s (1999) argument
that the ‘high-velocity labor market’ of Silicon Valley can be
significantly attributed to California’s long-standing proscription
of non-compete agreements.”133

127. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.761 (1905).
128. Michigan Antitrust Reform Act (MARA), id. § 445.774a (2022).
129. See generally Matt Marx, Deborah Strumsky & Lee Fleming, Mobility, Skills, and
the Michigan Non-Compete Experiment, 55 MGMT. SCI. 875 (2009).
130. Id. at 877.
131. Id. at 879, 881, 887.
132. Id. at 887.
133. Id. (citing Gilson, supra note 110). Barnett and Sichelman criticized this study for
mistaking correlation with causation: “Even if the results in these studies were somehow
correct, none of these studies can show causation between noncompete enforcement and
their findings of reduced innovation . . . .” Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 123, at 1023.
However, as explained with regard to similar criticisms about attributing California’s
noncompete ban to the rise of Silicon Valley, this Article does not posit that noncompete
enforcement is the sole explanation for a region’s innovation and economic success, but it
does suggest that a lack of noncompete enforcement at least positively contributes.
Moreover, as Barnett and Sichelman concede, the Michigan study took efforts to rule out
other variables, such as foreign competition in the auto industry. Marx et al., supra note
129, at 881; Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 123, at 1023.
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The study further posited that restrictions on job mobility may
have led prospective employees to migrate to less restrictive
regions: “That specialists are more immobilized by noncompetes
than other inventors within a region suggests that they may seek
career opportunities outside an enforcing state. . . . [S]uch
incentives and behavior might help explain an agglomeration of
talent in non-enforcing areas such as Silicon Valley.”134
In witnessing the negative impact repealing its noncompete ban
had on Michigan’s inventor scene, one may wonder why the state
legislature decided to repeal its ban. The answer: it never did.
Michigan’s noncompete ban was repealed as part of the Michigan
Antirust Reform Act (“MARA”), which was modeled after the
Uniform State Antitrust Act of 1895.135 As the study noted, “more
than [twenty] pages of legislative analysis of MARA by both House
and Senate subcommittees do not mention noncompetes as a
motivation for the bill.”136 A Michigan labor attorney who
examined the act contemporaneous with its passing reported to the
study that “there was no buildup, discussion, or debate . . . . [T]his
appeared to be a rather uniform reaction . . . I have never been able
to identify any awareness . . . that this was a conscious or
intentional act.”137
In other words, Michigan unintentionally—unknowingly—
repealed its noncompete ban as a part of sweeping antitrust
reform. And according to this study, it is paying a price—a price on
which regions with noncompete bans like Silicon Valley are
currently cashing in138 and a price of which jurisdictions with new

134. Marx et al., supra note 129, at 887. In an attempt to undermine this study, Barnett
and Sichelman pointed out that Michigan’s repeal of its noncompete ban contained a savings
clause that kept all noncompete agreements entered into prior to the repeal unenforceable.
Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 123, at 1022. “As a result,” they argued, “one would expect
that the number of employees in Michigan actually subject to enforceable noncompetes
would be quite low for a considerable period following MARA’s passage.” Id. at 1022–23.
While that may be true, Barnett and Sichelman fail to account for the decades of new
noncompete agreements that have followed since this repeal. The study did not merely look
to changes in Michigan immediately following the ban’s repeal. It observed inventors
spanning from 1975 up until 2006—over twenty years after Michigan’s repeal. Marx et al.,
supra note 129, at 879. As noncompete agreements typically only last a few years at most,
the Michigan study’s sample size covers far more than the noncompete agreements entered
into immediately prior to or after the repeal.
135. Marx et al., supra note 129, at 877.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See Chelsea A. Master, Note, Michigan’s Non-Compete Debate: Balancing Employer
and Employee Interests, 15 AVE MARIE L. REV. 191, 204 (2017) (“[C]ompanies in states where
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noncompete bans, like the District of Columbia and potentially
Virginia, could be taking advantage.
B. Virginia’s Current Noncompete Law Is Inadequate
One may look unfavorably upon employee noncompete
agreements, as Virginia courts have,139 yet still believe that a
categorical ban of them is not a solution. Instead, one may believe
the current common law voiding unreasonable noncompete
agreements is a sufficient safeguard of employee interests, or one
may believe Virginia adequately addressed any shortcomings in its
common law with its new low-wage employee ban and notice
requirements.140 This Section serves to dispel those beliefs and
affirm the need for a categorical ban of employee noncompete
agreements in Virginia.
1. Virginia’s Noncompete Common Law Is Unpredictable
Virginia’s current common law rules for the enforceability of
noncompete agreements are wildly unpredictable, leaving employers and the even more disadvantaged employees in a constant state
of uncertainty about their rights and obligations. As explained
above, an employee noncompete agreement is currently
enforceable in Virginia so long as it satisfies three common law
considerations: (1) it is necessary for a legitimate business interest
of the employer; (2) it is not unduly burdensome on the employee’s
efforts to earn a livelihood; and (3) it does not violate public
policy.141 Despite these three black-letter principles, however,
Virginia employment law experts warn, “[T]he application of those
principles to particular factual settings continues to produce
surprises . . . . [N]oncompete agreements, seemingly simple and
straightforward on the surface, pose a trap for the unwary client
and attorney.”142

non-competes are unenforceable (such as Google and Apple located in Silicon Valley,
California) are willing to relocate individuals with specialized expertise. As a result, instead
of being bound by a non-compete clause, an employee with specialized skills is more likely
to move to a state where noncompete clauses are unenforceable, such as California.”
(citations omitted)).
139. See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text.
140. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.7:8 (2021).
141. See supra Section I.D.1.
142. VA. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., supra note 58, at II-1.

SULLIVAN MASTER COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

11/30/2022 10:55 AM

BANNING NONCOMPETES

261

To illustrate the unpredictability of Virginia’s noncompete
common law, compare two Supreme Court of Virginia cases:
Paramount Termite Control Co. v. Rector143 and Home Paramount
Pest Control Cos. v. Shaffer.144 The court upheld the noncompete
agreement at issue in the former and voided the noncompete
agreement at issue in the latter.145
The noncompete agreement at issue in Paramount Termite
Control read as follows:
The Employee will not engage . . . in the carrying on or conducting the
business of pest control, fumigating, and termite control . . . in any
county or counties in the state in which Employee works in which the
Employee was assigned during the two (2) years next preceding the
termination of the Employment Agreement and for a period of two (2)
years from and after the date upon which he shall cease for any reason
whatsoever to be an employee of PARAMOUNT.146

The noncompete agreement at issue in Home Paramount Pest
Control read as follows:
The Employee will not engage . . . in the carrying on or conducting the
business of exterminating, pest control, termite control and/or
fumigation services . . . in any city, cities, county or counties in the
state(s) in which the Employee works and/or in which the Employee
was assigned during the two (2) years next preceding the termination
of the Employment Agreement and for a period of two (2) years from
and after the date upon which he/she shall cease for any reason
whatsoever to be an employee of [Home Paramount].147

Yes, the noncompete agreements in each case are virtually
identical. They address the same duration, geographic scope, and
type of employment. As the plaintiff names would suggest, the
noncompete agreements are even from the same employer:
Paramount Termite Control Co., Inc. was a former name of Home
Paramount Pest Control Cos., Inc.148

143. 238 Va. 171, 380 S.E.2d 922 (1989).
144. 282 Va. 412, 718 S.E.2d 762 (2011).
145. Compare Paramount Termite Control, 238 Va. at 176, 380 S.E.2d at 926, with Home
Paramount Pest Control, 282 Va. at 419, 718 S.E.2d at 765.
146. Paramount Termite Control, 238 Va. at 172–73, 380 S.E.2d at 924.
147. Home Paramount Pest Control, 282 Va. at 414–15, 718 S.E.2d at 763 (alteration in
original).
148. See Business Entity Search, COMMONWEALTH OF VA. STATE CORP. COMM’N CLERK’S
INFO. SYS., https://cis.scc.virginia.gov/ EntitySearch/Index [https://perma.cc/2HUX-2TUR]
(enter “Paramount Termite Control Co.” in the “Entity Name” field and click “Search”).
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The Paramount Termite Control court held that the noncompete
agreement was necessary to protect a legitimate business interest,
was not unduly burdensome, and did not violate public policy.149
Twenty-two years later, the Home Paramount Pest Control court
held that the noncompete was overly broad with respect to the
scope of employment, barring any employment in the pest control
business whatsoever, and was therefore unenforceable.150
The court acknowledged that it approved the same language in
a contract by the same company, but it responded that stare decisis
“is not an inexorable command” and “was never meant to prevent
a careful evolution of the law.”151 The Home Paramount Pest
Control court overruled Paramount Termite Control, stating, “One
condition warranting a departure from precedent is where the law
has changed in the interval between the earlier precedent and the
case before us.”152
However, as Justice Elizabeth A. McClanahan rightfully pointed
out in her Home Paramount Pest Control dissent, the law never so
changed.153 The three-prong test is the same today as it was in
2011 and the same as it was in 1989.154 The facts were the same.
The law was the same. What changed to result in a different
outcome? The Court.
Home Paramount Pest Control was the first Supreme Court of
Virginia case substantively ruling on noncompete law since
Omniplex.155 Omniplex was decided by a four-to-three vote.156 By
2011, just two justices from the Omniplex court remained on the
bench—one of whom joined the dissent in that case.157 While Kevin
E. Martingayle argued that the Home Paramount Pest Control case
was not the seismic shift of Virginia noncompete law some scholars

149. Paramount Termite Control, 238 Va. at 175–76, 380 S.E.2d at 925.
150. Home Paramount Pest Control, 282 Va. at 419, 718 S.E.2d at 765.
151. Id. at 419, 718 S.E.2d at 766.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 420–21, 718 S.E.2d at 766–67 (McClanahan, J., dissenting).
154. Id.; see supra Section I.D.1.
155. Kevin E. Martingayle, Non-Competition Agreements in the Aftermath of Home
Paramount Pest Control v. Shaffer, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 457, 463 (2012). While the court did
hear a noncompete case in 2007, it was decided on procedural grounds. See Parikh v. Family
Care Ctr., Inc., 273 Va. 284, 291, 641 S.E.2d 98, 101 (2007) (holding that failure to practice
medicine in Virginia precludes any legitimacy in enforcing an unlawful noncompete
agreement).
156. Martingayle, supra note 155, at 463.
157. Id.
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were making it out to be—that it was instead a mere continuation
of Virginia’s disfavor of noncompete agreements that has persisted
since the turn of the century158—he still admits: “With significant
turnover on the court, there was no accurate way to predict what
the court would do in the new Home Paramount decision.”159
“Omniplexity” was in action: the outcome of this noncompete case
depended on the intangible factor that is the personal makeup of
the court.160
This is dangerous. As Justice McClanahan warned, “[W]ere
judicial opinions ‘to be the private opinion of the judge, people
would then live in society, without exactly knowing the nature of
their obligations.’”161 Fickle principles that result in varying
outcomes dependent on the subjective views of arbiters—so much
so that the same noncompete agreement can be held enforceable or
unenforceable depending on its day in court—leave employees and
employers alike uncertain about how to proceed. Moreover,
wherever the law is unclear, it is the already disadvantaged who
suffer most.162
The Supreme Court of Virginia has not made a substantive
ruling on noncompete law in the last few years,163 but the confusion
surrounding noncompete agreements is likely to mount. An
already unpredictable legal precedent is likely to become even
more tumultuous in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic’s
shockwaves through Virginia employment law. For example, Dean
E. Lhospital discussed the quandary many noncompete agreements found themselves in with the necessity of telemedicine
during the pandemic.164 Specifically, the question of a reasonable

158. Id. at 457–58.
159. Id. at 463 (emphasis added).
160. Haley & Ford, supra note 64, at 30.
161. Home Paramount Pest Control Cos. v. Shaffer, 282 Va. 412, 421, 718 S.E.2d 762,
767 (2011) (McClanahan, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE
MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS 165 (J.V. Prichard ed., Thomas Nugent trans., G. Bell &
Sons, Ltd. 1914) (1752)).
162. See infra Section III.B.
163. The Supreme Court of Virginia has only heard two noncompete cases since Home
Paramount Pest Control, both in the years shortly thereafter. See Preferred Sys. Sols., Inc.
v. GP Consulting, LLC, 284 Va. 382, 732 S.E.2d 676 (2012) (upholding a noncompete
agreement as a reasonable restraint on trade); Assurance Data, Inc. v. Malyevac, 286 Va.
137, 747 S.E.2d 804 (2013) (reversed and remanded trial court demurrer on procedural
grounds).
164. See generally Dean E. Lhospital, Expansion of Telemedicine During COVID-19 and
the Issue of Non-Compete Agreements, 69 VA. LAW. 18 (2021).
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geographic scope within a noncompete agreement, once a relatively
simple inquiry when the medical provider and patient were in the
same location, is now a muddled mess.165 Where is the medical
provider practicing? From where they are located? From where the
patient is receiving treatment? Both? Neither? Virginia noncompete law is not prepared to resolve this conundrum, yet this
change in how we perceive employment demands immediate
clarification: “Historically, there is a certain lag-time between the
emergence of a new technology and when the courts can digest and
assimilate the development and settle into any kind of postprandial ease. Right now, courts are just opening their menus.
Physicians and employers are already asking for the check.”166 This
change in Virginia employment is not unique to the medical
profession, nor is it going away with the COVID-19 pandemic;
remote employment is here to stay.167 It is just one instance of a
change in Virginia’s socioeconomic climate that its common
noncompete law was not prepared to address. Virginia should not
allow such uncertainty to continue and should instead outright ban
employee noncompete agreements.
2. Virginia’s Recent Noncompete Legislation Is Insufficient
One may recognize the uncertainty in Virginia’s noncompete
common law, as well as the abuses that result, yet nonetheless
believe that those concerns were adequately addressed by
Virginia’s recent noncompete legislative reform.168 However, the
new legislation banning “low-wage employee” noncompete
agreements and adding notice requirements only further muddies
the waters of Virginia’s noncompete law and insufficiently
addresses the negative impact of noncompetes on Virginia’s job
market as a whole.
Section 40.1-28.7:8 of the Code of Virginia merely replaces one
confounding question for another: instead of asking “Is this
noncompete unenforceable because it unreasonably restrains
trade?” we are now asking “Is this person considered a low-wage
employee?”169 The answer remains a moving target, with Virginia
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 20.
Id.
See id. at 18, 20.
See supra Section I.D.3.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.7:8 (2021).
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instilling a complicated calculation with variable figures to
determine whether someone is exempt from noncompete
agreements.170 An employee who does not immediately meet the
requirements for a “low-wage employee” on their start date could
even become a “low-wage employee” over the course of employment
under Virginia’s metric, and vice versa.171
This disadvantages employees by merely continuing the
uncertainty about to which obligations employers can and cannot
bind them. The new notice requirements do little to resolve this.172
Noncompete agreements are often presented on or before the first
day of employment, and eighty-eight percent of employees do not
negotiate them.173 When faced with the risk of losing a job
opportunity by contesting a noncompete agreement an employer
may or may not be able to enforce, most just take the job security
and sign the dotted line.174
The uncertainty of who is a “low-wage employee” also disadvantages employers by levying a hefty penalty for any miscalculations.
Entering into, enforcing, or even threatening to enforce a
noncompete agreement with an employee who at the time turned
out to be “low-wage” results in a $10,000 penalty per violation.175
Put another way, a start-up company who simultaneously distributes to its ten employees a uniform employment agreement containing a noncompete clause could be immediately on the hook for
as much as $100,000. Such a fatal effect should not have such a
variable cause.
One solution may be to retain Virginia’s low-wage employee ban
but redefine what constitutes “low-wage.” Indeed, of the ten states
that have passed similar bans, Virginia is the only one to use an
average wage calculation as its metric; the others either set concrete thresholds or use federal standards like the federal poverty
level.176 However, no matter what metric is used, restricting a noncompete ban to just “low-wage employees” is a half-measure solu170. See id. §§ 40.1-28.7:8(A), 65.2-500(B) (2021 & Cum. Supp. 2022).
171. See id. § 40.1-28.7:8(A) (2021).
172. See id. § 40.1-28.7:8(G) (2021).
173. COUNCIL OF D.C. COMM. ON LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV., supra note 33, at 3 & n.11
(citing ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN & HEIDI SHIERHOLZ, ECON. POL’Y INST., NONCOMPETE
AGREEMENTS (2019)).
174. See id.
175. § 40.1-28.7:8(E) (2021).
176. Beck, supra note 29.
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tion that creates more burdens than it resolves. The District of
Columbia recognized this when it rejected its “low-wage” ban—
based on a metric of three times the minimum wage—for a
“simpler, fairer, more practical, and more enforceable” complete
ban.177
Moreover, any “low-wage employee” noncompete ban only
scratches the surface. Employee noncompete agreements are
widespread across all industries, hindering the wages, entrepreneurship, and job market at all salary ranges.178 Indeed, noncompetes are most common among higher-wage employees: fortyfive percent of respondents to a 2016 survey with at least a college
degree said they were bound by a noncompete.179 Enforcing
noncompete agreements for higher-wage employees could have
adverse effects on the region’s general economy, as it is could
encourage (or in some cases force) employees to migrate to other
regions.180 The issues of unpredictable common law, unfair bargaining power, and stagnation of growth do not go away after
enough zeroes are added to a paycheck. The truly adequate solution to these issues is to ban employee noncompete agreements
entirely.
III. ADDRESSING COUNTERARGUMENTS
If the recent legislative history in the District of Columbia is any
sign,181 some—namely, employers—will push back on the idea of a
general ban on employee noncompete agreements. This Section
serves to address what this Article anticipates as the two most
common counterarguments to the ban by preemptively alleviating
the concerns that spawn them.
A. “Banning Employee Noncompete Agreements Leaves
Legitimate Business Interests Vulnerable”
Employers will likely push back on the idea of banning employee
noncompete agreements out of fear that such a ban will eliminate
177.
178.
179.

COUNCIL OF D.C. COMM. ON LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV., supra note 33, at 2.
See generally Balan, supra note 96, at 3–4; Greenhouse, supra note 27.
COMM. ON LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV., supra note 33, at 5 (citing COLVIN &
SHIERHOLZ, supra note 173).
180. Marx et al., supra note 128, at 887.
181. See supra Section I.C; COMM. ON LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV., supra note 41, at 1–2.
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a crucial tool to protect their legitimate business interests. They
will likely worry that they would otherwise have nothing to stop
an employee from working for them, gaining valuable knowledge
and experience from the employer’s resources, then suddenly
quitting and immediately taking what they gained to the
competitor across the street.
Before giving such a hypothetical credence, an employer should
first consider what exactly are the legitimate business interests
they fear jeopardizing with this rogue employee. Most likely, these
legitimate business interests are the employer’s intellectual
property. Employers worry that rogue employees will learn their
trade secrets and disclose them to a competitor. They worry that
rogue employees will learn about their customers and take those
customers with them when they leave. These worries align with
what Virginia has historically identified as legitimate business
interests when upholding noncompete agreements.182
Yet noncompete agreements are unnecessary to protect these
interests; employers will still be able to adequately protect them
despite a noncompete ban.183 If an employer wants to prevent an
employee from disclosing their trade secrets, they can require the
employee to sign a confidentiality agreement.184 If an employer
wants to prevent an employee from stealing away their customers,
or even other employees, they can require the employee to sign a
nonsolicitation agreement. The ban this Article proposes expressly
excludes such confidentiality and nonsolicitation agreements from
its scope.185 While a noncompete agreement likewise restricts a
rogue employee’s ability to disclose trade secrets or solicit customers—by restricting an employee’s ability to compete at all—
“[c]ovenants not to compete are effective in the same sense that
burning down a house to eliminate termites is effective: the problem is eliminated but the collateral damage from the solution is

182. See cases cited supra note 54 and accompanying text.
183. See generally Viva R. Moffat, The Wrong Tool for the Job: The IP Problem with Noncompetition Agreements, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 873 (2010).
184. Confidentiality agreements are just one of several other ways employers can protect
their intellectual property other than noncompete agreements, such as bolstering their
security measures or protecting through federal registration. See, e.g., Andrew Riley &
Robert A. Hall, Three Strategies for Small Businesses to Protect Their Intel-lectual Property,
66 VA LAW. 32 (2017).
185. See infra Part IV.
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worse than the problem itself.”186 Banning employee noncompete
agreements would eliminate their disadvantages without sacrificing their advantages, as they are all sufficiently addressed
already by alternative, less problematic contract provisions.
Alan J. Meese recently argued that these “less restrictive
alternatives” are “less effective, more costly to administer, or
both.”187 Attacking confidentiality agreements specifically, Meese
claimed they
would require the original employer continually to expend resources
monitoring ex-employees, wherever employed, to determine whether
they have disclosed such information. If a breach occurs, the former
employer will have to sue a former employee who may deny
wrongdoing. Such lawsuits are not costless, and courts are imperfect
arbiters of conflicting testimony that may reflect good-faith
disagreements about the source of particular knowledge.188

However, all of Meese’s criticisms could be levied, in equal or
even greater measure, against noncompete agreements. An
employer would also need to continually monitor former employees
to ensure they are not working for a competitor within the
noncompete agreement’s scope. Upon such a discovery, an
employer would still need to sue the former employee, who may
challenge the noncompete agreement’s enforceability—a legal
question that has led to much more “imperfect” arbitration and
“good-faith” disagreement.189

186. Christopher Mack, Note, Postemployment Noncompete Agreements: Why Utah
Should Depart from the Majority, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 1201, 1209 (quoting Todd M. Malynn,
The End of Judicially Created Restraints on Competition, COMPETITION, Spring 2009, at
43).
187. Alan J. Meese, Don’t Abolish Employee Noncompete Agreements, 57 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 631, 691–92 (2022).
188. Id. at 694–95.
189. See supra Section III.B.1. Meese also criticizes the efficacy of confidentiality
agreements, explaining that a former employee may be judgment proof and that injunctive
relief may not arrive until after the former employee had already disclosed the employee’s
trade secrets. Meese, supra note 187, at 695. Again, these criticisms are not unique to
confidentiality agreements. The judgment proof criticism persists regardless of whether a
former employee violates a confidentiality agreement or a noncompete agreement. With
respect to the prior disclosure criticism, the issue at hand is not whether confidentiality
agreements adequately protect trade secrets as a standalone matter, but whether they
protect trade secrets at least as well as noncompete agreements. They do. It is an equally
likely scenario that a former employee has disclosed trade secrets to a competitor before the
former employer realized that such a relationship existed in violation of a noncompete
agreement. The existence of a noncompete agreement over a confidentiality agreement does
nothing to address the concerns Meese raises.
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Finally, a lasting response to those employers who are worried
about employees leaving them for competitors absent a
noncompete agreement: treat your employees well then. An
employer who harbors loyalty among their employees through fair
wages, quality working conditions, and other positive incentives is
much more conducive to all interests than a contractually obligated
loyalty with the threat of litigation.190
This response also does not mean to suggest—as Meese claimed
it does—that employers should merely offer raises in salary to
prevent employee defection.191 Meese argued such a claim fails to
account for the disadvantage employers face in salary “bidding
wars” with competitors because of the employer already incurring
costs of training the employee.192 However, “treat your employees
well” does not stop at payroll. Employers can further retain
employees with quality working conditions, company morale, a
compelling company mission or vision, and non-wage employee
benefits, including equity incentive plans or pension plans.193
Meese’s argument also fails to address the external costs facing
employees and competitors that could balance out such “bidding
wars.” Moving and reorientation costs of employees, as well as
onboarding costs of competitors, could deter defection. If an
employer can foster a relationship with employees convincing them
of a bright present, and the possibility of an even brighter future,
they can dissuade employees from believing the “cash” is any
greener on the other side.
Meese also raised the concern that a noncompete ban could
result in larger firms freely plucking employees away from smaller
firms such as startups.194 However, Meese assumes that employees
will always prefer larger firms over smaller ones. He fails to
consider that some employees may be drawn to the much higher
upside potential of incentive equity from startups over similar
equity incentives from established companies. Again, salary is not
the only factor in choosing an employer. An employee may be
incentivized to join a promising startup early at the potential for

190. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
191. Meese, supra note 187, at 695.
192. Id.
193. This Article suggests that forfeiture provisions for such profit-sharing and pension
plans upon working for a competitor should be excluded from the proposes employee
noncompete ban. See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
194. See Meese, supra note 187, at 708.
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equity returns far exceeding what equity they would receive from
a successful, though relatively stagnant, large company.
B. “What About the Freedom of Contract?”
Another counterargument to the proposed ban on employee
noncompete agreements is that it infringes on the longstanding
freedom of contract. Rather than have Virginia pass a sweeping
ban on all employee noncompete agreements, some may argue that
private parties should instead be allowed to decide the fairness and
benefits of such an agreement themselves through each given
contract. If an employee thinks an offered noncompete agreement
is legally enforceable against them and agrees to it in exchange for
employment, that employee should justifiably be bound. Others,
such as Meese, argue that “[i]n a well-functioning market,”
employees could benefit from negotiation over noncompete
agreements by asking for additional compensation in exchange for
accepting the term.195 “These wage demands will induce employers
to internalize the prospective costs that the [noncompete] provision
imposes on such employees. As a result, employers would only
adopt such provisions if the benefits, e.g., higher productivity
resulting from enhanced training, exceeded the employee’s
anticipate costs, reflected in higher wages.”196 In other words,
noncompete agreements are the product of bargaining parties
achieving a compromise with optimal benefits of both.
However, it is hardly ever the case that a noncompete agreement’s scope is certain to be enforceable in Virginia, and studies do
not support such a “well-functioning market” in which employees
are in position to ever contest them. As explained above,
employees—as well as employers and even attorneys—struggle to
know with any certainty whether a noncompete agreement would
be enforced by a court.197 A 2012 study also reported that less than
10% of employees bound by a noncompete agreement reviewed it
with an attorney before signing, and almost half of them were timepressured to sign or told the noncompete agreement was a
nonnegotiable condition for employment.198

195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 666 (citing Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 123, at 1036).
Id. at 666–67 (citing Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 123, at 1037–38).
See supra Section III.B.1.
Marx & Fleming, supra note 101, at 59.
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Take the Jimmy John’s noncompete agreement for example.199
A Virginia court would likely hold a noncompete with such broad
scope on duration, territory, and type of services unenforceable.
However, out of all the current and former Jimmy John’s
employees across the country, just two challenged the noncompete
agreement in court.200 The rest likely did not have the
sophistication, bargaining power, will, or resources to challenge
their employer. “For every covenant that finds its way to court,
there are thousands which exercise an in terrorem effect on
employees who respect their contractual obligations . . . . [T]he
mobility of untold numbers of employees is restricted by the
intimidation of restrictions whose severity no court would
sanction.”201 This lopsided power dynamic is exacerbated by the
fact that Virginia has provided no clear guidance on which
noncompetes are and are not enforceable.202 When Virginia’s best
practice to review the enforceability of noncompete agreements is
to compare them with those adjudicated in the past—yet a case
like Home Paramount Pest Control, which seems like a slam-dunk
based on said practice, reaches an opposite result203—who are the
jobseekers that will challenge the noncompete agreements offered
by prospective employers?
While the freedom of contract is an important principle that
should be respected, so too is the freedom of trade.204 As Virginia
itself has recognized by including a public policy consideration in
all noncompete cases, a balance of these competing freedoms is
crucial to optimizing the rights of all parties involved.205 To say it
is fair to bind employees to the noncompete agreements they sign
is to ignore the drastic difference in bargaining power and access
to litigation between employer and employee.
IV. MODEL LEGISLATION
To aid the Virginia General Assembly, as well as other
jurisdictions who may follow suit, this Part proposes model
199. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
200. See First Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 23, at 8–9.
201. Blake, supra note 53, at 682–83.
202. See supra Section III.B.1.
203. See supra notes 143–50 and accompanying text.
204. See Hill, supra note 46, at 8 (“Diametrically opposed to the freedom of contract is
the freedom of trade.”).
205. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
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legislation adopting a ban of employee noncompete agreements.
This Article takes various insights from the evolution of the
noncompete bans of California, Oklahoma, North Dakota, and the
District of Columbia.206 Whereas those jurisdictions engaged in
backlash and backpedaling due to initial bans that were overly
broad, this Article hopes to propose model legislation synthesizing
those legislative histories into a fair, simple, and clear ban that
preemptively addresses any concerns the opponents of such a ban
could raise. Accordingly, this Article proposes the following
legislation, with a specific recommendation that the Virginia
General Assembly repeal Section 40.1-28.7:8 of the Code of Virginia with the following legislation in its place:
A.

Subject to the limitations contained within subsection B below,
all noncompete restrictions against employees and independent
contractors within Virginia (or are otherwise subject to Virginia
law), whether entered into before, during, or after the enactment
of this act, are hereby invalid per se within the Commonwealth of
Virginia.

B.

Notwithstanding subsection A above, subsection A shall not apply
to the following:
i.

ii.

iii.

Noncompete agreements reasonably related to a sale or
purchase of a business, regardless of the form of such
sale or purchase. For the avoidance of doubt, this subsection B(i) applies to, among other forms, the sale or
purchase of the goodwill of a business, a controlling
ownership interest of a business, or all or substantially
all of the assets of a business.207
Noncompete agreements reasonably related to the dissociation of a partner from a partnership (including
limited partnerships and limited liability partnerships), the termination of a member’s interest in a limited liability company (including professional limited
liability companies), or termination of a shareholder’s
interest in a corporation.208
Nonsolicitation restrictions prohibiting an employee or
independent contractor from soliciting a subject employer’s employees or customers.209

206. See supra Sections I.A, I.C.
207. Similar exceptions have been added to the noncompete bans in California,
Oklahoma, and North Dakota. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16602–02.5; OKLA. STAT. tit.
15, § 219; N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06(2).
208. A similar exception has been added to the noncompete ban in Oklahoma. See OKLA
STAT. tit. 15, § 219B.
209. A similar exception has been added to the noncompete ban in California. See CAL.
BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16606–07.

SULLIVAN MASTER COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

11/30/2022 10:55 AM

BANNING NONCOMPETES

iv.

v.

vi.

C.

273

Confidentiality restrictions restricting an employee or
independent contractor from disclosing certain employer confidential information to anyone other than
the employer and/or employer’s agents (such as, but not
limited to, trade secrets, customer lists, or pricing
formulas).
Noncompete restrictions against an employee or independent contractor reasonably related to a bona fide
agreement between a business entity and one or more
of its investors, of which the employee or independent
contractor evidences their consent through a signed
writing.210
Noncompete restrictions against an employee in which
the sole remedy for the employee’s breach of such restrictions is the forfeiture of the employee’s benefits under a pension plan or profit-sharing plan with an employer.211

For the avoidance of doubt, the exceptions described in subsection
B above shall be subject to the then current case law governing
the validity of such restrictions, together with any other then
applicable statutory law(s) affecting the validity of such restrictions.212

210. This Article preemptively recognizes the legitimate business interests not only of
employers who seek noncompete agreements for their employees, but also of potential
investors of the employers, especially in cases when the employer is a startup. Investors
likely want assurance before investing that key employees of a company in which they seek
to back will not leave and compete with the company shortly after the investment. This
exception provides potential investors a safeguard in which they can condition their
investment on an employee’s enforceable agreement not to compete. Legislators should
consider further drafting this legislation to specify certain “key” employees that investors
may bind to a noncompete—for similar policy reasons for and by similar means as the recent
low-wage noncompete bans by multiple states. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
However, legislators should do so with the shortcomings of such employee definitions—such
as those of Virginia’s low-wage noncompete ban—in mind. See supra Section II.B.2.
211. This exception would codify the federal preemption of state law by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461.
Even with respect to California’s noncompete ban, the Ninth Circuit has held that ERISA
preemptively upholds the validity of noncompete forfeiture provisions in employee benefit
plans. Hummel v. S.E. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d 446, 450 (9th Cir. 1980); Lojek v. Thomas,
716 F.2d 675, 678–80 (9th Cir. 1983); Clark v. Lauren Young TireCenter Profit Sharing Tr.,
816 F.2d 480, 481–82 (9th Cir. 1987). While the authors of this Article find employee
noncompete agreements outright prohibiting an employee from working to be an unfair
restraint on the freedom of trade, they do find noncompete forfeiture provisions of postemployment benefits to be a reasonable cost that employees could be made to pay in order
to accept a job opportunity with a competitor.
212. For purposes of Virginia, this subsection keeps Virginia’s common law and threeprong test for reasonable noncompete agreements intact. Despite the test’s shortcomings
highlighted supra Section II.B.1, it is not entirely without value in reasonably balancing the
interests of employers and employees with respect to enforceable noncompete agreements.
That said, Virginia should view this Article as a call, and this subsection as an opportunity,
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D. Any employee or independent contractor that successfully
defends any action by any given employer as a result of subsection
A above, shall be entitled to the recovery of such employee’s or
independent contractor’s reasonably incurred attorneys’ fees and
court costs associated with such defense. Moreover, a court may
award additional damages and/or penalties against any employer
who intentionally violates subsection A above.213

CONCLUSION
Given the above, the authors of this Article believe that the time
is now to make proactive, progressive changes to Virginia’s
noncompete laws in the form of banning employee noncompete
agreements. We should not wait for the next event or economic
wave to occur before we react. By then, think of what could have
been in place had we acted sooner. Every little change for the better
counts; why not universally ban noncompetes within employment
context now? What we are suggesting above is a simple way to keep
Virginia competitive, and further enhance its standing, on a stateby-state basis, come whatever what may as Virginia moves
forward.

to clarify its common law reasonableness requirements, or better yet, codify clear geographic
or durational limits, as other states have recently done. See generally Beck, supra note 15.
213. The matter of enforcement of this ban and penalties for employers who violate it is
a complex discussion outside the immediate scope of this Article. The authors believe that
certain requirements and penalties of past bans are unduly harsh and burdensome on
employers. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.7:8(E)–(F) (2021) (imposing on employers a
$10,000 penalty per violation of Virginia’s low-wage non-compete ban, in addition to the
reasonable attorney fees of the employee); id. § 40.1-28.7:8(G) (2021) (requiring employers
to post a copy of Virginia’s low-wage noncompete ban or a summary thereof anywhere other
employee notices are required and penalizing employers up to $1,000 for failing to do so); 69
D.C. Reg. 9910 (Aug. 5, 2022) (penalizing employers with fines up to $3,000 for violating the
District of Columbia’s noncompete ban). At a minimum, this model legislation imposes
recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees and court costs for successful defenses against
unenforceable employee noncompete agreements as a deterrent for employers from attemptting to enter into such agreements with employees. However, the authors of this Article
recognize the need to protect less sophisticated employees who may not be aware of their
rights and ability to challenge such agreements. This Article accordingly advises state
legislatures like the Virginia General Assembly to consider additional enforcement
measures, such as (1) requiring a conspicuous notice of the noncompete ban on all employment agreements and policies, or (2) extending recovery of attorneys’ fees to employees who
retain counsel in sending a demand letter to rescind a previously imposed noncompete
agreement, without the need of a successful defense in court.

